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 The paper provides a discussion of alternative measure of energy affordability.
 We examine the emergence of fuel poverty in Italy from 1998 to 2011.
 We assess the appropriateness of the Italian energy beneﬁts eligibility criteria.
 A simulation shows that the energy beneﬁts have little impact on fuel poverty.
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 15 April 2014
Received in revised form
7 September 2014
Accepted 8 September 2014
Keywords:
Energy affordability
Fuel poverty
Energy beneﬁts
Vulnerable consumers
a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we discuss a number of ways to deﬁne and measure the affordability of energy
consumption, and we examine the emergence of energy poverty in Italy in the period from 1998 to
2011. The paper examines the eligibility criteria for claiming the beneﬁts available to support energy
consumption for vulnerable families and it identiﬁes the potential beneﬁciaries. The study assesses the
appropriateness of the eligibility criteria by comparing the population targeted by the policy with the
population actually facing affordability problems. A simulation exercise, using the hypothetical scenario
most likely to result in energy beneﬁts being made available, shows that, regardless of the affordability
index adopted, the provision of state energy beneﬁts has little impact on fuel poverty.
& 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
It is well-known that escalating energy prices have led to real
and growing affordability problems for many utility customers
even in advanced countries. These problems are likely to have
been exacerbated by the recent ﬁnancial crisis. There is also
growing anxiety about the potential effect of policies aimed at
countering climate change on the price consumers pay for energy
and thus for most essential products.
As highlighted in a recent report of the EU Citizens’ Energy
Forum (Vulnerable Consumer Working Group, 2013), many EU
governments have implemented different measures – ranging
from speciﬁc government support to pay energy bills (i.e. social
tariffs, beneﬁts, discounts, delayed payments) to broader social
security measures (i.e. general income and housing support) – in
order to help low income households and other socially vulnerable
groups. Consequently, the beneﬁciaries and the results of these
measures may vary considerably from country to country.3 How-
ever, the relevant information needed to assess these interven-
tions is rarely made available, making it difﬁcult to investigate
their effectiveness.
There is a lively debate about the concept of affordability and the
statistical indices used to assess fuel poverty, different approaches
can produce quite different pictures of the situation as documented
in the Hills Report (Hills, 2012).4 Q5Affordability criteria should be
sensitive to changes in supply side variables (i.e. energy prices,
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technology, conditions of service) and, at the same time, they must
take into consideration consumer needs and preferences. This
seems to be particularly complex, given the heterogeneity of
household living conditions and composition.
This study aims to provide some evidence about the Italian
experience. On the basis of our discussion on the pros and cons of
the different affordability criteria, we look at the dynamics of the
affordability issue in the Italian electricity and gas markets for the
period 1998 to 2011 using the annual Surveys on Family Budgets
(SFB). Gas and electricity are the main sources of home energy in
Italy, where basically all households consume electricity and the
share of households using natural gas for heating and/or cooking
rose from 63.5% in 1998 to 76.5% in 2011. As expected, the results
depend to a large extent on which measures are used. However, by
any measure, electricity and gas unaffordability in Italy seems to be
on the increase since 2007, accompanied by a remarkable reduction
in household spending capacity.
The study then looks at the electricity and gas beneﬁts scheme
introduced in 2008 and designed to support low income house-
holds in Italy. We ﬁrst investigate the extent to which the existing
rules accurately identify the households with the greatest energy
affordability problems, and we assess whether the policy would
have been effective in reducing energy affordability problems if all
eligible households had received the beneﬁt.
Our analysis, based on data from the 2011 EU Survey on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), highlights that the eligibility rules
have several limitations: about 12.5% of the households in absolute
poverty do not meet the criteria. Only 43% of the households at
risk of poverty and no more than 59% of those with affordability
problems qualify for the beneﬁts. The value of the beneﬁts in 2011
was on average €68 for electricity and €92 for gas, corresponding
respectively to 0.9% and 1.6% of the net income of the eligible
households. If all those entitled had taken up the beneﬁt, the total
cost of the scheme would have been €409.9 million, equivalent to
0.026% of the GDP. The amount of beneﬁt available from the
scheme and its failure to target households in need accurately
means that even in the most favourable scenario the scheme has
no signiﬁcant impact on the affordability of gas and electricity, no
matter what type of indicator is used to depict the phenomenon.
2. Methods
According to the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act (UK
Government, 2000Q3 ), a person is said to be in fuel poverty “if he is a
member of a household living on a lower income in home which cannot be
kept warm at a reasonable cost”. This deﬁnition points to the different
causes of fuel poverty i.e. low income, efﬁcient home equipment, high
energy consumption. Demographic circumstances, the nature of hous-
ing tenure and the heating system all matter in fuel poverty
(Boardman, 1991, 2010). The complex interactions of these elements
and their detrimental effects on the quality of life, social attainment
and health, have been also investigated referring to the wider issue of
“energy poverty” and evaluated through – at least – three main
different approaches: (i) the technical evaluation of home efﬁciency;
(ii) the households’ perception of their energy needs; (iii) the economic
analysis of energy affordability (Bouzarovski, 2013). In the present
paper we adopt the latter approach andwe present typical measures of
affordability which are based on the incidence of energy spending on
total expenditure or income. We then describe the relative new
indicators which are based on the notion of residual income.
2.1. Affordability indices based on energy spending as a budget share
The notion of affordable energy consumption is based on the
idea that it is undesirable that the expenditure on these basic
goods exceeds a critical threshold: beyond this limit, households
presumably struggle in covering the costs and consequently ad
hoc policies would be recommended.5 The general idea is that
energy consumption is part of an essential basket of goods which
every household should be able to afford in order to have a
“normal” standard of living in terms of heating conditions and
use of household appliances. In practice, once policy makers have
determined the level of the critical threshold, a household is
considered to have an affordability issue for energy consumption
if it exceeds that limit and it can then be said exhibit what the UK
has labelled “fuel poverty” (DEFRA, 2001, 2007). Accordingly, such
households should be considered as part of the target population
for which the beneﬁts scheme was designed.
Within the class of indices based on budget shares, we distinguish
different alternatives. In the UK, the level to consider is the expenditure
needed to keep adequately warm the house, irrespectively of actual
energy consumption. This approach allows one to identify those
households that over-consume energy without needing to, as well as
those that under-consume energy but that would need to consume
more to live in an adequately heated home. The disadvantage of this
approach is that it is particularly data demanding, as it requires an
accurate estimate of households’ energy needs given the characteristics
of their accommodations. These data are available for representative
samples of the population in the UK, and they are at the basis of the old
and new fuel poverty measurements (see Hills, 2012). When such data
are unavailable, as in continental Europe, the actual level of energy
expenditure is used to assess the affordability of energy consumption,
which some authors refer to as “expenditure fuel poverty” (e.g. Bennett
et al., 2002) or “economic energy insecurity” (e.g. Hernández, 2013).
In this context, a headcount index (HI) is the percentage of
consumers whose actual energy expenditure exceeds a given fra-
ction of their income. In most studies, this critical threshold has
been ﬁxed between 5% and 10%.6 This approach does not incor-
porate any information about a desirable amount of consumption,
either for utilities or other goods. For instance, a policy based on
such a criterion does not address, and may potentially exclude from
the set of eligible households, impoverished consumers who do not
have access to the service either because of limited supply or bec-
ause of high ﬁxed costs.
Formally, deﬁne xh the total expenditure for household h, and
xuh its observed expenditure in utilities: a household has problems
of affordability of its energy consumption if the ratio rh ¼ xuh=xh is
larger than a given threshold, ru. Considering any population, the
extent of the affordability problem is measured by the headcount
index HI, that is the fraction of households for whom rhZru.
In our view, such a concept of affordability cannot provide useful
information on either the extent of the problem, or its depth. As for
the former issue, it excludes from the deﬁnition of fuel poverty those
households in absolute poverty that decide – because of economic
constraints – to spend very little in utilities. Moreover, this approach
can label as “fuel poor” some relatively well-off households that are
characterised by high energy consumption.
2.2. Affordability indices based on residual income
A different way of measuring affordability stems from the
observation that energy is not the only item essential for a decent
life, and that spending on energy can become problematic where it
leaves a household insufﬁcient income to consume other goods or
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
5 Some studies in economic literature have highlighted the idea that policy
makers should consider essential levels of energy consumption – and more
generally of public utility services – as a merit good and consequently address
policies to support lower consumption (Hancock, 1993; Sandmo, 1983; Besley,
1998).
6 See also Fankhauser and Tepic (2007), Chaplin and Freeman (1999), Hancock
(1993), Sefton (2002), Sefton and Chesshire (2005), Waddams Price et al. (2012).
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services. The indices presented in Section 2.1 completely neglect
this point.
The notion of “residual income” was ﬁrst used to study
problems of affordability in the ﬁeld of housing economics
(Thalmann, 2003). Adapting this approach to energy consumption,
we can say that there is a problem with energy affordability if the
household does not have sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources to fund a
minimum level of consumption of other goods after paying bills
for gas and electricity.
Note that this approach focuses on ﬁnancial difﬁculties incurred
as a result of the consumption of public utilities (Stone, 1993).
Moreover, it allows one to identify at least three types of house-
holds with affordability issues for which different types of inter-
ventions are suitable:
(i) Households unable to access the minimum amount of essen-
tial commodities and utilities: in this case, the problem of
energy affordability can be alleviated by income support
mechanisms which are not conditional on the actual level of
consumption;
(ii) Households with limited income that over-consume: in this
case, an appropriately targeted action should address the reason
why this happens (preferences, technological constraints, inefﬁ-
cient equipment, etc.);
(iii) Households whose consumption is below the minimum stan-
dard due to monetary or non-monetary constraints (e.g. lack of
access to gas or electricity networks): in this case, interventions
should ﬁrst be aimed at removing these constraints.
We consider a household to be “residual income poor” if its
residual income, deﬁned as the difference between the total
observed expenditure and the actual energy expenditure, is not
sufﬁcient to purchase the minimum bundle of non-energy goods
and services which are considered necessary for a decent standard
of living (xcp). Whenever the actual expenditure for energy is lower
than the minimum standard expenditure for energy (xup) the hou-
sehold is instead classiﬁed as “under-consumers”. The extent of the
affordability problem is then measured by the fraction of residual
income poor households in the population ðHRIu Þ, the fraction of
under-consumers ðHRIc Þand, by combining the two deprivation
conditions, the fraction of residual income poor and/or under-
consumers ðHRIÞ.
`The above indices do not consider the difference between the
minimum consumption level and household’s income and therefore
give no guidance on the level of subsidy needed. This information is
instead conveyed by the average gap between theminimum standards
and the actual expenditures of the residual income poor ðGIRIu Þand the
under-consumers ðGIRIc Þ.
With respect to the budget share approach, the residual income
framework has the advantage of distinguishing between the differ-
ent causes of fuel poverty (income poverty, over-consumption or
under-consumption) and of assessing (through the poverty gap
indices) the monetary transfer needed to support the households in
need. Both aspects are crucial in the design of effective policies
aimed at alleviating the problem of fuel poverty.
The suggested residual income approach to affordability measure-
ment can be compared with the “after fuel costs poverty” measure
discussed by Hills (2011). A household is deﬁned to be “after fuel
costs poor” if its disposable income after actual housing and fuel
needs falls below the 60% of the median value of the same quantity
for the entire population. We deviate from this deﬁnition in at least
three directions: (i) we consider actual energy expenditure; (ii) we
set the income threshold based on the absolute poverty approach
rather than the relative one, as in the Minimum Income Standards
(Hills, 2011); (iii) we consider consumption under the minimum
standard as possible source of deprivation.
Hills’ Low Income and High Costs (LIHC) indicator classiﬁes
households as fuel poor if “they have required fuel costs above the
median level; and were they spend that amount, they would be
left with a residual income below the ofﬁcial poverty line”, where
the ofﬁcial poverty line is a relative poverty line (Hills, 2012).
Again, we deviate from the LICH indicator for the same reasons
itemised in the previous paragraph and because we consider all
households with insufﬁcient income as facing an energy afford-
ability problem.
We believe that as we consider the actual energy expenditure
rather than fuel needs, spending less than the minimum standard
is potentially a major concern because it indicates that the house-
hold is consuming less than what is considered necessary for a
decent quality of life, where this standard is set in absolute
(physical) terms. It may be the case that some of the under-users
demand less energy because their accommodation and electric
apparels are more efﬁcient than standard ones, but at the same
time the under-users include those families that when facing the
“to heat or to eat” dilemma (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) choose to
drastically reduce their energy expenditure (and at the extreme, to
be disconnected). Given the potentially noisy signal provided by
the under-users group, we treat the results for this group with
caution and provide evidence on the possible causes of under-
consumption.
Finally, we do not see any plausible reason to exclude any
households in absolute poverty from the set of those facing energy
affordability problems. Households in absolute poverty cannot
afford the minimum standard of energy and of other goods at
the same time. Supporting these families with social tariffs or
energy beneﬁts (or improving the efﬁciency of their accommoda-
tion) would help them reach the minimum standard of energy
consumption and at the same time it would free resources for
other essential goods. In this respect, we consider fuel poverty
policies as part of a multi-facet strategy against poverty and
material deprivation.
3. Results
We apply the affordability measures outlined in Section 2 to
the consumption of electricity and gas in Italy; to this end, we
need to follow two preliminary steps:
(i) Deﬁne the threshold (ru) above which the budget share
indicates the presence of an affordability problem.
(ii) Set the level of the minimum standard expenditures for
electricity and gas (xup) and the other goods (xcp).
3.1. Setting the minimum standards and the budget share thresholds
We set the values for the minimum expenditure of gas and
electricity (xup) and for the sum of the other goods (xcp) as equal to
those included in the deﬁnition of the ofﬁcial Italian poverty line
(ISTAT, 2009), and we estimate them for each household sampled
by the Italian Central Statistical Institute (ISTAT) for the Survey on
Family Budgets from 1998 to 2011.
Table 1 shows the average monetary value of the minimum
standards for electricity, gas and other goods in Italy in 2011. For
electricity, the value of the reference consumption does not depend on
the area of residence and it amounts to about half of the actual median
expenditure. The minimum expenditure for gas is deﬁned as the hea-
ting and cooking component of the poverty line. It depends on the
number of household members by age group, which also deﬁnes the
standard size of the dwelling, and the use of regional adjustment
coefﬁcients account for heterogeneity in both climatic conditions and
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construction standards (see Appendix A for further details). The
estimated value of the gas reference expenditure is about 80% of the
actual median spending except for small households living in warm
areas, where it is considerably smaller than the median expenditure.
Given such relatively high level of minimum standard expenditures for
electricity and gas, we expect under-consumption to be diffused
among the households, except in the warm areas.
Not all Italian households use natural gas for heating and/or
cooking. The percentage of households using heating oil decreased
from 18.6% in 1998 to 5.7% in 2011 in favour of the use of natural gas
(rising from 63.5% to 76.5% in the same period). The use of other types
of energy for heating has been almost stable during the period under
consideration: LPG and other liquid fuels about 8%, wood about 6% and
other energy sources (including electricity) about 3%. As a consequence,
we differentiate the minimum standard for other goods (xcp) between
users and non-users of natural gas. In the latter case the value of xcp
includes the minimum expenditure for heating and cooking.
For the deﬁnition of the threshold values ru, we can adopt
several alternative approaches:
(i) A “normative” approach, that internalises the implicit value
judgements adopted in the construction of the absolute
poverty line. In this case the maximum sustainable threshold
(ru) is deﬁned as the ratio between the value of the sub-
sistence level of the household referred to energy (xup) and
the value of overall subsistence spending (xp¼xupþxcp). This
ratio varies with household size, area of residence and relative
price, thus acknowledging the role played by economies of
scale, climate conditions and prices.
(ii) A “positive” approach, that looks at the balance sheets of
households with low purchasing power and deﬁnes the max-
imum sustainable threshold (ru) as the median value of the
share of energy expenditure for the households in a state of
relative poverty. This threshold is conditional on household
size and geographical area and varies over time due to changes
in relative prices and household consumption decisions.
(iii) The standard approach that sets a threshold equal for all types
of households is the one which at least apparently yields
more interpretable results. Much of the literature sets the
threshold at 10% for gas (including heating) and 5% for
electricity (e.g. Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007).
Table 2 allows us to appreciate the difference between the
alternative approaches showing for the year 2011 the thresholds
computed according to the criteria (i) and (ii) described above. For
electricity, the thresholds set by criterion (i) are about half of those
set according to the second approach, while the differences are
narrower in the case of gas. Note that the standard thresholds of
10% for gas and 5% for electricity are much higher than those
identiﬁed by the criteria (i) and (ii), and therefore their use
classiﬁes fewer household as “fuel poor”.
3.2. Affordability indices based on energy spending as a budget
share: Different pictures but same dynamics since the 2007 recession
Table 3 provides an initial insight into the relevance of electricity
and gas affordability in Italy, based on the incidence of energy
spending on household budgets. For each year, the table shows the
average thresholds and the estimates of the headcount index for
electricity and gas (referring only to those households actually
connected to the natural gas network). The left-hand panel refers to
the normative approach (where threshold values are implicit in the
poverty line); the central panel shows the results for the positive
approach (where threshold values are set with reference to the
observed budget share of the low income households); while the
right-hand panel considers the threshold of 5% for expenditure on
electricity and 10% for gas. Adopting the normative criterion, the
percentage of households spending an excessive share of their
budget on electricity varies from 33.7% in 1998 to 51.4% in 2010.
Using the positive criterion the percentage of households with
electricity affordability problems is halved and estimates range
between 14.8% in 2007 and 20.1% in 1999. Finally, setting the limit
constant at 5%, the percentage remains between 5% (in 2000) and
8.1% (in 2009).
Different criteria deliver remarkably different pictures of the
affordability of electricity consumption, both in terms of overall levels
and dynamics. Nevertheless, all methods agree in indicating a worsen-
ing of the sustainability of electricity bills coinciding with the start of
the Great Recession. With regard to gas consumption, the indices
computed with the normative and the positive approaches have a
similar size, but their time changes differ signiﬁcantly: the normative
headcount index varies from 20.4% in 2001 to 28.9% in 2009, while
with the positive criterion it ranges between 24.7% in 2003 and 33.4%
in 2000. Moreover, two out of three indicators show consistent
evidence in favour of the claim that the affordability of gas consump-
tion has worsened in recent years.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
Table 1
Q7 Average monetary value of the minimum reference monthly expenditure for utilities and other goods.
No. of household members Electricity Gas
Warm Mild Temperate Cold
1 12.01 5.33 36.49 36.51 53.36
2 16.34 20.27 47.76 52.12 68.27
3 22.33 27.17 53.79 59.17 75.12
4 25.13 40.94 61.98 68.05 87.79
5 þ 27.29 55.90 73.82 82.38 102.72
No. of household members Other goods (food, housing, etc.)
Warm Mild Temperate Cold
No gas With gas No gas With gas No gas With gas No gas With gas
1 563.96 556.05 614.81 634.19 647.80 624.12 739.93 682.33
2 801.03 779.45 870.63 868.71 889.19 858.70 1025.34 953.41
3 1035.76 1006.74 1106.69 1106.82 1139.85 1091.55 1301.22 1220.38
4 1260.45 1222.44 1349.52 1311.79 1331.91 1302.77 1566.30 1471.95
5 þ 1456.33 1430.94 1531.08 1501.59 1506.09 1468.43 1774.63 1718.28
Values for 2011, by climatic classiﬁcation of the area of residence.
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3.3. Affordability indices based on residual income: Residual income
poverty increases during the recession, under-spending is price
sensitive
Let us now consider the measures related to the residual
income approach shown in Table 4.
In this case we account for the sum of the costs of electricity and
gas accurately, taking into consideration whether or not the house-
hold uses natural gas. The ﬁrst column shows the fraction of
households classiﬁed as being in absolute poverty, that is, those
whose expenditure falls below the absolute poverty line. From 2007
to 2011, the percentage of households in absolute poverty has
increased by almost 50%, rising from 5.2% to 7.7%. Column (A) shows
HIRIu , the fraction of households deﬁned as residual income poor, i.e.
those households whose expenditure, net of electricity and gas bills,
is lower than the value of the minimum bundle of other goods nec;
essary to guarantee a decent standard of living. We can observe that
this fraction ﬂuctuated around 5.5% until 2007, reaching 8.4% in
2011. The fraction HIRIc of under-users, namely the households
whose expenditure on electricity and/or gas is less than the
subsistence level as identiﬁed by the poverty line, varies over time.
In particular, the proportion of under-users has decreased from
approximately 30% to 20.6% between 1998 and 2005 and then
increased to 24.9% in 2011 (see column (B)).
The high percentage of under-users is a consequence of the relative
“generosity” of the minimum reference expenditure for gas, which is
almost equal to the observed median expenditure for heating. The
combination of residual income poor and under-users, column (C),
estimates in about 30% the percentage of households with affordability
problems. As expected, the majority of these households are not poor
in the absolute sense. Table 4 presents also the percentage of residual
income poor and under-users who are not absolutely poor. The ﬁrst
group of households varies between 0.5% and 0.7% until 2007, with a
recent increase to more than 0.9%. Overall, at least 85% of the residual
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
Table 2
Critical thresholds ru for the budget share approach.
No. of household members Thresholds based on components of the
absolute poverty line (1)
Thresholds based on budget shares of households
in relative poverty (2)
Electricity Electricity
Warm Mild Temperate Cold Total Warm Mild Temperate Cold Total
1 0.0209 0.0182 0.0181 0.0161 0.0176 0.0526 0.0412 0.0525 0.0325 0.0403
2 0.0201 0.0179 0.0179 0.0158 0.0173 0.0453 0.0384 0.0365 0.0274 0.0341
3 0.0211 0.0192 0.0193 0.0170 0.0186 0.0424 0.0355 0.0275 0.0291 0.0329
4 0.0196 0.0182 0.0184 0.0159 0.0176 0.0362 0.0344 0.0290 0.0258 0.0307
5þ 0.0185 0.0177 0.0185 0.0151 0.0171 0.0390 0.0301 0.0298 0.0232 0.0300
Total 0.0203 0.0183 0.0184 0.0161 0.0177 0.0442 0.0374 0.0379 0.0290 0.0350
No. of household members Gas Gas
Warm Mild Temperate Cold Total Warm Mild Temperate Cold Total
1 0.0094 0.0511 0.0523 0.0715 0.0594 0.0398 0.0511 0.0718 0.0745 0.0663
2 0.0250 0.0497 0.0552 0.0660 0.0566 0.0278 0.0404 0.0550 0.0610 0.0524
3 0.0258 0.0444 0.0497 0.0571 0.0490 0.0242 0.0475 0.0409 0.0502 0.0448
4 0.0318 0.0435 0.0481 0.0555 0.0473 0.0268 0.0400 0.0388 0.0437 0.0390
5þ 0.0370 0.0458 0.0523 0.0560 0.0492 0.0187 0.0297 0.0505 0.0289 0.0305
Total 0.0247 0.0476 0.0519 0.0642 0.0539 0.0285 0.0445 0.0540 0.0596 0.0517
Values for 2011.
Table 3
Affordability measures based on the budget share approach.
Normative approach Positive approach Standard approach
Electricity Gas Electricity Gas Electricity Gas
Average
threshold
HI Average
threshold
HI Average
threshold
HI Average
threshold
HI 5% threshold HI 10% threshold HI
1998 0.0200 0.3372 0.0523 0.2287 0.0283 0.1987 0.0382 0.3236 0.0588 0.0575
1999 0.0191 0.3726 0.0523 0.2317 0.0286 0.2012 0.0451 0.2824 0.0647 0.0568
2000 0.0198 0.3352 0.0543 0.2186 0.0279 0.1868 0.0363 0.3340 0.0497 0.0578
2001 0.0196 0.3698 0.0542 0.2039 0.0296 0.1894 0.0387 0.3241 0.0526 0.0508
2002 0.0189 0.4066 0.0508 0.2536 0.0306 0.1768 0.0466 0.2714 0.0565 0.0589
2003 0.0187 0.4122 0.0510 0.2503 0.0315 0.1685 0.0493 0.2471 0.0578 0.0515
2004 0.0177 0.4331 0.0502 0.2637 0.0308 0.1668 0.0476 0.2653 0.0548 0.0532
2005 0.0179 0.4458 0.0528 0.2621 0.0319 0.1616 0.0529 0.2498 0.0582 0.0589
2006 0.0194 0.4220 0.0555 0.2607 0.0340 0.1566 0.0515 0.2692 0.0600 0.0688
2007 0.0197 0.4262 0.0543 0.2167 0.0344 0.1481 0.0412 0.3001 0.0542 0.0483
2008 0.0202 0.4706 0.0561 0.2505 0.0370 0.1556 0.0495 0.2639 0.0710 0.0605
2009 0.0196 0.4920 0.0534 0.2894 0.0366 0.1648 0.0520 0.2744 0.0806 0.0735
2010 0.0181 0.5138 0.0519 0.2852 0.0362 0.1559 0.0536 0.2519 0.0716 0.0649
2011 0.0177 0.5042 0.0539 0.2708 0.0350 0.1614 0.0517 0.2645 0.0690 0.0645
Average threshold ratios for normative and positive approaches and headcount indices (HI) for electricity and gas. Threshold and HI for gas refer to gas users only.
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income poor households are actually absolutely poor, that is unable to
afford the minimum standards of consumption either of energy or of
other goods. On the other hand, less than 10% of the under-consumers
are also poor in absolute terms.
The last two columns of Table 4 provide useful insight about the
main forces driving the dynamics of affordability, that is, changes in
relative prices and real income. They show the ratio of the energy
products consumer price index (CPI) over the general CPI, and the
ratio of the GDP at constant (2005) prices over its 1998 value, both
ratios rebased to one in 1998. Relative prices have been almost
constant until 2005; since then, energy prices began to increase more
than average. Real GDP grew slowly but steadily until 2007, it
drastically dropped in 2009 (5.5%) and it weakly recovered in the
last two years. Comparing prices and GDP dynamics with the
dynamics of the headcount indices for the residual income poor and
the under-users (columns A and B), it is apparent that the surge of the
energy prices has driven the rise of both indices between 2005 and
2008. The 2009 drop in real GDP has been so strong that, despite the
reduction of energy prices, the number of residual income poor
households kept increasing.
The number of under-users instead tracked more closely the
energy price dynamics, that is, it decreased in 2009 and 2010 and it
increased in 2011. The latter result makes evident that the two
components of our affordability indicator have different sensitivity
to income and price changes. As the percentage of under-users
varies with energy prices, we conjecture that most of the under-
users are households who cut their energy consumption under the
minimum standards when fuel price increases and increase it when
energy becomes more affordable. Households that consume con-
sistently less than the minimum standard because of their energy
efﬁcient dwellings should be less sensitive to price variations.
In order to assess to what extent energy under-utilization is
actually a signal of affordability problems, we try to identify what
induces households to consume less than the minimum standards.
For expositional convenience we focus on the under-users who are
not absolutely poor in 2011. We estimate them to be 22.26% of the
households connected to the natural gas grid (see Table 4). Few of
them, about 62,000 out of 5.4 million of under-user households
(1.15%), do not have any heating system in their houses: for these
households under-consumption is a signal of deprivation, because
living in a heated accommodation is a necessary condition for a
decent standard of living. About 12% of the under-users (around
648,000 households) heat their houses using heating oil, LPG or
other forms of energy. The gas bill of these households does not
include the expenditure for heating, and it is likely to be lower
than the minimum standard expenditure (which instead includes
heating). In this case under-consumption is not a concern, as it is
caused by the use of an alternative form of energy.
For the vast majority of the under-users the causes of under-
utilization are not so clear. We therefore resort to a multivariate
regression analysis to show that, ceteris paribus, richer, larger and
older families are signiﬁcantly less likely to spend less than the
minimum standard for energy, that living in a small house and/or in
a multi-unit building rather than in a single unit/detached house
increases the probability of under-consumption by about 10 percen-
tage points, and that the incidence of under-consumption in the
coldest area is 28 percentage points higher than in the warmest area.
Moreover, additional evidence from the EU-SILC shows that the
fractions of households reporting arrears on utility bills or claiming
difﬁculties to keep their home warm are the same among the under—
users and all the other households. All together, these results suggest
that in many cases under-utilization may not be considered a major
indicator of affordability problems. Unfortunately, we are not able to
disentangle between two alternative explanations, that is, that under-
utilization is due to the fact that the household’s actual accommoda-
tion is smaller and/or more insulated than the one considered to set
the minimum reference expenditure, or that the standard dwelling is
adequate but the associate reference expenditure is badly overesti-
mated for the coldest areas of the country.
So far, we have only looked at headcount indices, which simply
count the number of households “with affordability problems”. In the
case of the residual income approach, it is particularly informative to
study the depth of the phenomenon among these households. Indeed,
in this framework the average deviation from minimum standard
expenditure is an exact measure of the average money transfer
required to ensure that residual income poor households can consume
the current amounts of electricity and gas and – at the same time – be
able to afford the subsistence basket of other goods; for the under-
consumers, it is the index that identiﬁes the transfer that would allow
them to consume the minimum amount of electricity and gas, leaving
their current spending on other goods unchanged.
The average deviations for the residual income poor and the under-
consumers (GIRIu and GI
RI
c respectively) are reported in Table 5. Our
estimates show that not only energy is less affordable for more Italian
households today than in the past (see Table 4), but also that
households are affected by this issue in an increasingly serious way.
In fact, for the residual income poor households, the amount which
they would need to ﬁnance the sufﬁcient consumption of other items
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Table 4
Affordability measures based on the residual income approach.
Below the absolute
poverty line
(A) (B) (C) Above the absolute poverty line Energy/general CPI Real GDPt/GDP1998
Residual
income poor
Under-users A and/or B Residual
income poor
Under-users
1998 0.0537 0.0572 0.2897 0.3256 0.0051 0.2668 1.000 1.000
1999 0.0545 0.0596 0.2745 0.3136 0.0065 0.2527 0.952 1.015
2000 0.0517 0.0557 0.3003 0.3328 0.0057 0.2754 1.019 1.052
2001 0.0562 0.0595 0.2929 0.3292 0.0054 0.2677 1.045 1.071
2002 0.0551 0.0607 0.2540 0.2955 0.0073 0.2331 0.976 1.076
2003 0.0504 0.0551 0.2337 0.2717 0.0064 0.2150 0.988 1.075
2004 0.0492 0.0544 0.2157 0.2573 0.0059 0.2021 0.950 1.094
2005 0.0470 0.0523 0.2057 0.2461 0.0066 0.1925 0.990 1.104
2006 0.0487 0.0547 0.2365 0.2760 0.0069 0.2204 1.074 1.129
2007 0.0518 0.0563 0.2523 0.2905 0.0062 0.2325 1.075 1.148
2008 0.0646 0.0707 0.2493 0.3006 0.0086 0.2275 1.143 1.134
2009 0.0667 0.0740 0.2329 0.2886 0.0099 0.2120 1.115 1.072
2010 0.0668 0.0759 0.2244 0.2804 0.0112 0.2024 1.044 1.090
2011 0.0772 0.0841 0.2493 0.3089 0.0090 0.2226 1.080 1.095
Gas and electricity together. Headcount indices for absolute poverty, overall energy poverty (C) and by cause of deprivation (A and B).
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has increased from €128 per month in 1998 to €200 per month in
2011 (þ56%)—compared to an inﬂation of 36.6% in the same period.
For the under-users, however, the distance from the threshold has
remained unchanged in real terms.
4. Discussion
The Italian policy regarding beneﬁts payable for electricity and
gas consumption was set forth by Law 266 of 23 December 2005,
and then implemented through two decrees in 2007 (electricity
bonus) and 2008 (gas bonus). The declared aim of the policy was
to support:
(i) households living in poverty—or on its margins;
(ii) large households;
(iii) in case of electricity, households which include a disabled, or
a critically ill person.
The program is funded through speciﬁc components in trans-
mission or distribution prices, paid by all consumers.
The income eligibility criteria for electricity and gas beneﬁts are
the same7; and the spending ability of the family is tested by using
a synthetic indicator called ISEE (the acronym for “Indicatore di
Situazione Economica Equivalente”, that is, the Equivalent Eco-
nomic Conditions Indicator). The indicator combines information
about income, real and ﬁnancial assets, and the composition of the
household. To be eligible, the household’s equivalent income ind-
icator must not exceed €7500 unless the family includes more than
three dependents, in which case the threshold is increased to
€20,000.
Given that the beneﬁts are paid in the form of lump sum
discounts on electricity and gas bills, a necessary eligibility condi-
tion is that the household is a domestic customer in its primary
residence. In the case of electricity, some limits to the installed
power must be met (3 kW for up to four household members,
4.5 kW if more), unless the household includes a person who needs
essential electro-medical appliances. In the case of gas, customers
having a condominium contract (usually due to the presence of
centralised heating) receive their beneﬁt with a bank transfer.
All domestic customers meeting the above criteria can apply for
the beneﬁts by ﬁling a form with the municipality where they
reside. As the eligibility criteria are independent of actual con-
sumption levels, the ubiquity of the power grid guarantees that all
Italian households meeting the above requisites are potential
beneﬁciaries of the electricity bonus. The availability of the gas
beneﬁt instead is affected by the limited penetration of the gas
distribution grid which does not serve many mountainous areas
and the entire Sardinia region.
The electricity bonus depends on the number of components
and it is independent of actual consumption, with the exception of
the presence of electro-medical appliances, where it is calculated
on the ground of the electricity usage intensity. For gas, the
discount is proportional to the family size and depends on the
classiﬁcation of the municipality according to its typical winter
temperature and the declared use (hot water and cooking and/or
heating, see Appendix B).
4.1. Assessing the appropriateness of the eligibility criteria
All the affordability indicators discussed in previous sections
refer to actual and/or standard expenditure in order to identify
households in need. The eligibility criteria used to determine
electricity and gas beneﬁts in Italy are instead independent of
actual household consumption. In order to assess to what extent
the eligibility criteria are able to identify those households facing
affordability problems, we have made use of the 2011 EU-SILC data
to classify the households according to different energy poverty
criteria which we then compare with their eligibility status.
The 2011 EU-SILC survey allows us to compute the equivalent
income indicator (ISEE) for every family participating in the
survey, but the data do not reliably identify the households which
might be beneﬁciaries of the electricity beneﬁts for health reasons;
therefore, we have focused exclusively on the households eligible
for electricity beneﬁts for economic hardship, which are the vast
majority of recipients (see online supplementary documentation
for details). Some approximation is necessary for gas as well.
In fact, with the EU-SILC data we can determine whether the
household uses gas for cooking and/or heating, but the EU-SILC
questionnaire does not distinguish between natural gas and other
kinds of gas, thereby leading to an overestimate of the pool of
eligible customers. Moreover, we cannot observe the cost of gas
included in general condominium expenses (see online supple-
mentary documentation for details).
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Table 5
Average monthly gap.
No gas With gas
(A) (B) (As) (Bs) (Ac) (Bc)
Residual income poor Under-users Residual income poor Under-users Residual income poor Under-users
1998 128.45 16.99 139.96 4.14 114.31 20.00
1999 122.02 16.59 124.20 3.68 118.94 19.54
2000 128.03 19.41 140.41 4.04 117.74 21.99
2001 126.88 18.93 138.48 4.09 116.84 20.93
2002 141.88 18.62 151.48 4.14 134.80 20.07
2003 144.52 19.01 153.11 4.03 137.84 20.65
2004 141.01 18.83 147.78 3.71 136.03 19.91
2005 148.87 21.40 163.58 3.88 136.88 22.27
2006 145.21 22.80 150.60 4.46 141.07 24.07
2007 156.49 23.29 169.51 4.74 149.06 24.03
2008 182.03 25.67 192.31 4.26 175.71 26.62
2009 188.26 24.24 213.28 4.45 173.14 25.20
2010 187.27 22.37 201.79 4.81 180.12 23.23
2011 200.36 25.48 209.06 4.51 195.08 26.51
Average monthly gap from the minimum standards for the residual income poor and the under-consumers. Euro, current prices.
7 For detailed information about the beneﬁt design, see 〈http://www.autorita.
energia.it/it/bonus_sociale.htm〉.
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We ﬁrst provide a new description of the affordability of gas
and electricity, the incidence of poverty, and the eligibility status
for the energy beneﬁts. Although we maintain the deﬁnitions of
affordability illustrated in the previous sections, their implemen-
tation is slightly different, mainly because we now refer to
disposable income rather than to total expenditure.
4.1.1. About 10% of the Italian households are eligible for the energy
beneﬁts
The adult equivalent income is estimated at an average of €33,567
in 2011, its distribution is such that 5.3% of the households are in the
state of absolute income poverty and 19.5% are at risk of poverty8
(see Table 6). In this scenario, the electricity beneﬁts provide support
to potentially 11.5% of households (about 2.9 million families), while
9.2% of the households (2.3 million) qualify for the gas beneﬁt.
Depending on which strategy is adopted to set the critical threshold
for the budget shares, the percentage of households in difﬁculty
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Table 6
Average income, fraction of income poor, eligible households, and households with affordability problems.
Adult
equivalent
income
Poor At risk of
poverty
With affordability problems
Budget share approach Residual income approach
Beneﬁt eligible Electricity Gas Electricity & Gas
Electricity Gas Normative Positive 5% Normative Positive 10% Residual
income
poor
Under-users
Total 33,576.1 0.0533 0.1947 0.1146 0.0919 0.3827 0.0933 0.0611 0.1756 0.0585 0.0262 0.0557 0.2673
Household types
No children
Single 37,495.7 0.0513 0.2394 0.1084 0.0819 0.4156 0.0679 0.0737 0.2760 0.0357 0.0425 0.0537 0.2733
2 Adults, less than 65 yrs 39,354.8 0.0462 0.1250 0.0732 0.0594 0.3344 0.0805 0.0480 0.1381 0.0438 0.0213 0.0466 0.2749
2 Adults, at least 65 yrs 33,910.8 0.0078 0.1373 0.0980 0.0805 0.3492 0.0676 0.0349 0.1314 0.0202 0.0149 0.0084 0.2615
Others 35,962.0 0.0196 0.1084 0.0654 0.0486 0.2612 0.0649 0.0268 0.0811 0.0355 0.0085 0.0203 0.2397
With children
Single parent 22,145.6 0.2058 0.3440 0.3340 0.2682 0.5704 0.2504 0.1843 0.3054 0.2105 0.0911 0.2189 0.3033
2 Adults, 1 child 30,102.1 0.0638 0.1728 0.1195 0.1021 0.3302 0.1202 0.0628 0.1711 0.0716 0.0224 0.0689 0.2640
2 Adults, 2 children 26,139.6 0.0832 0.2336 0.1383 0.1167 0.4408 0.1304 0.0720 0.1357 0.1168 0.0160 0.0857 0.2578
2 Adults, 3 or more
children
22,206.8 0.1475 0.3676 0.2875 0.2194 0.5635 0.2247 0.0953 0.1770 0.1735 0.0251 0.1564 0.3149
Others 26,371.4 0.0692 0.2475 0.1377 0.1208 0.4671 0.1234 0.0530 0.0867 0.0860 0.0147 0.0699 0.2821
Region
North 37,629.8 0.0340 0.1153 0.0597 0.0529 0.3229 0.0471 0.0307 0.0966 0.0304 0.0306 0.0341 0.3434
Centre 36,498.4 0.0402 0.1659 0.0850 0.0762 0.3227 0.0584 0.0385 0.0593 0.0419 0.0166 0.0422 0.3605
South and Islands 25,605.0 0.0908 0.3331 0.2163 0.1610 0.5107 0.1850 0.1212 0.4058 0.1219 0.0255 0.0968 0.0938
Degree of urbanisation
Densely populated area 36,187.17 0.0558 0.1807 0.1083 0.0892 0.3397 0.0867 0.0581 0.1400 0.0563 0.0188 0.0568 0.3252
Intermediate area 32,350.9 0.0484 0.1913 0.1035 0.0862 0.4162 0.0961 0.0606 0.1818 0.0554 0.0299 0.0515 0.2193
Thinly populated area 29,455.6 0.0585 0.2410 0.1586 0.1135 0.4178 0.1043 0.0704 0.2688 0.0737 0.0392 0.0629 0.2264
Tenure status
Outright owner 36,585.2 0.0243 0.1740 0.0605 0.0466 0.3425 0.0688 0.0432 0.1627 0.0307 0.0205 0.0263 0.2373
Owner paying mortgage 36,805.5 0.0285 0.0844 0.0363 0.0286 0.2988 0.0656 0.0333 0.1001 0.0386 0.0114 0.0291 0.2821
Tenant at market rent 23,351.7 0.1638 0.2717 0.3354 0.2897 0.5585 0.1959 0.1445 0.2556 0.1632 0.0602 0.1652 0.3345
Tenant at reduced rent 24,475.7 0.0918 0.3116 0.2764 0.2251 0.5220 0.1356 0.0834 0.1872 0.0927 0.0364 0.1010 0.3595
Free accommodation 29,955.8 0.0868 0.3007 0.1562 0.1076 0.4221 0.1131 0.0774 0.2482 0.0959 0.0299 0.0919 0.2885
Dwelling type
Detached house 32,050.6 0.0510 0.2282 0.1166 0.0869 0.4745 0.1224 0.0761 0.2441 0.0580 0.0330 0.0562 0.1601
Semi-detached house 32,844.0 0.0453 0.1876 0.1104 0.0860 0.4061 0.0936 0.0624 0.1874 0.0586 0.0353 0.0483 0.1831
In buildingo10 units 32,324.4 0.0722 0.2100 0.1380 0.1137 0.3840 0.0992 0.0694 0.1829 0.0793 0.0258 0.0750 0.2593
In buildingZ10 units 36,844.7 0.0454 0.1551 0.0938 0.0831 0.2806 0.0625 0.0398 0.1007 0.0413 0.0117 0.0445 0.4419
Leaking roof, damp,
broken windows etc.
29,472.4 0.0726 0.2511 0.1665 0.1323 0.4862 0.1305 0.0872 0.2363 0.0874 0.0393 0.0768 0.2279
Unable to keep home warm 24,456.0 0.1162 0.3710 0.2626 0.1960 0.5586 0.1797 0.1315 0.3065 0.1242 0.0448 0.1224 0.2033
Arrears on mortgage or rent 18,604.2 0.2551 0.4450 0.4443 0.3924 0.7066 0.2891 0.2287 0.3507 0.2796 0.0989 0.2638 0.2676
Arrears on utility bills 22,608.9 0.1574 0.3811 0.3055 0.2597 0.6082 0.2514 0.1740 0.3175 0.1956 0.0605 0.1657 0.1958
Excessive housing costs 28,785.4 0.0750 0.2544 0.1686 0.1403 0.4814 0.1322 0.0859 0.2173 0.0852 0.0344 0.0785 0.2355
Difﬁcult to face unexpected
ﬁnancial expenses
25,070.8 0.1020 0.3353 0.2248 0.1782 0.5274 0.1599 0.1107 0.2550 0.1142 0.0378 0.1070 0.2555
Difﬁcult to make ends meet 24,607.2 0.1026 0.3361 0.2320 0.1859 0.5414 0.1708 0.1160 0.2698 0.1200 0.0403 0.1078 0.2348
Statistics for gas affordability with the budget share approach refer to gas users only. Adult equivalent income (euro per year): household income net of taxes and
contribution to the social security system, including imputed rents, divided by the equivalence scale used for the deﬁnition of the absolute poverty line. Poor: households
whose adult equivalent income is below the absolute poverty line. At risk of poverty: households whose adult equivalent income is lower than 60% of median adult
equivalent income.
8 The adult equivalent income is deﬁned as household income net of taxes and
contribution to the social security system, including imputed rents and social
transfers, divided by the Carbonaro’s equivalence scale that is used for the
deﬁnition of the absolute poverty line. The households at risk of poverty are
deﬁned by Eurostat as those households whose adult equivalent income is less than
60% of median adult equivalent income.
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ranges from between 6.1% to 38.3% for electricity and between 2.6%
and 17.6% for gas. Resorting to the residual income approach, 5.6% of
households do not have sufﬁcient resources left after having paid
electricity and gas bills, while 26.73% families have energy expendi-
ture below the minimum standards. The statistics vary considerably
between different types of families. The incidence of income and fuel
poverty is higher among households with children, dramatically
higher in the case of single parents.
4.1.2. Tenants and southern households are more likely be eligible for
the beneﬁts
The percentage of households covered by the means-tested
beneﬁts tends to be higher among households with higher poverty
rates. It is not therefore surprising that the coverage rate for the
Southern regions is more than three times the coverage rate for
the richer northern regions, and that the percentage of eligible
families in rural regions is higher than the corresponding percen-
tage in more densely populated areas.
The quality of accommodation may play a crucial role in
determining energy consumption, and therefore its affordability.
Table 6 shows that households who own their homes are less
likely to face an affordability problem, to be income poor or to be
eligible for the beneﬁts. This is partly due to the fact that home-
owners are richer than tenants, but it is also the case that rented
houses are typically of lower quality in comparison with owner-
occupied houses. In fact, Table 6 highlights that where accommo-
dation is poorly maintained (e.g. leaking roofs, broken windows,
dampness or poor insulation), the likelihood of falling into fuel
poverty is higher.
4.1.3. Many households with energy bills arrears are not eligible for
the beneﬁts
Finally, we investigate whether households that declare difﬁculties
in coping with regular mortgage payments, rent and utility bills are
classiﬁed as poor and are supported by the electricity and gas beneﬁts.
Among the households with arrears (for economic reasons) on mor-
tgage or rent payments the percentage of the absolutely poor is above
25% and affordability problems are widespread. To a lesser extent, the
incidence of income and fuel poverty is also higher among households
with arrears (for economic reasons) on utility bills.
We might expect that households with arrears would be covered
by the beneﬁts system, but this is not so. Within this group, the
percentage of eligible households is three times the average, but
nevertheless more than 70% of families declaring difﬁculties in paying
bills are not eligible for the system. Even taking into account the
households who see themselves in ﬁnancial difﬁculty, either because
they consider their housing costs to be almost unbearable, or because
their savings are insufﬁcient to face unexpected expenses of about
€800 or because they struggle to make ends meet, there is a wide gap
between the number of households who see themselves in need and
the number of households potentially eligible for support.
4.1.4. Many households with energy affordability problems are not
eligible for the beneﬁts
Although perceived ﬁnancial difﬁculties may be relevant per se,
we prefer to rely on objective indicators. We therefore studied the
percentage of eligible households among the income poor
families, and also among the families facing energy affordability
problems according to the alternative approaches.
The stated aim of the electricity and gas beneﬁts scheme is to
support low income households, but the eligibility criteria do
not ensure that all the targeted families qualify for the beneﬁts.
In particular, Table 7 shows that:
– about 12.5% of the households absolutely poor do not qualify
for the beneﬁts, i.e. 170,000 poor families are not eligible for
these beneﬁts;
– only 43% of the households at risk of poverty qualify for the
beneﬁts, that is, 2.8 million households at risk of poverty are
not supported by the policy.
Our estimates also reveal that the eligibility criteria are parti-
cularly inadequate in addressing poor households without chil-
dren and/or not living in the Southern regions.
More than 40% of the households, whose electricity and/or gas
bills amount to more than 5% (10%) of their net income, are not
entitled to the beneﬁts; the coverage rate is higher (75%) if we
refer to households with gas affordability problems according to
the positive budget share approach. The percentage of potential
beneﬁciaries of the scheme among residual income poor house-
holds is about 87%, while on average only about 10% of under-
users are eligible. The fact that the eligibility criteria exclude a
signiﬁcant portion of households in need is due to a combination
of factors:
(i) the Equivalent Economic Conditions Indicator (ISEE) used to
assess the ﬁnancial resources of the households refers to a
deﬁnition of income that differs from that considered by the
standard poverty indicators. In fact, the ISEE considers gross
household income together with an estimate of the income
produced by real estate properties and ﬁnancial wealth, while
the poverty statistics refer to net household income including
imputed rents due to primary residence ownership and social
transfers;
(ii) the ISEE indicator is based on an equivalence scale that is
slightly different from that used for poverty deﬁnition. In
particular, the equivalence scale used in the ISEE indicator
considers the presence of disabled individuals, single parents
and couples with children where both partners are employed
(see online supplementary documentation), while the equiva-
lence scale used for the poverty indicators considers only the
size of the household and the age of its members;
(iii) the threshold value of the ISEE indicator is independent of the
region of residence; the components of the absolute poverty line
are instead region-speciﬁc, which allows it to consider regional
variations in prices, housing markets and heating needs;
(iv) the eligibility criteria do not depend on the household’s actual
energy consumption; the scheme, by its design, is not well
suited to deliver beneﬁts to consumers who face difﬁculties
despite an income above the subsistence level.
4.2. Assessing the potential effectiveness of the electricity and gas
beneﬁts scheme in ﬁghting fuel poverty
Let us now investigate to what extent the electricity and gas
beneﬁts schemes actually alleviate the energy affordability pro-
blems of low income households. We circumvented the lack of
publicly available data on the recipients of the beneﬁts by
assuming that all eligible households actually receive the beneﬁts
and comparing this outcome with a situation in which no such
scheme existed. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst make use of the EU-
SILC 2011 data to identify eligible households (as in Section 4.1).
We then use the eligibility rules to determine the appropriate
level of beneﬁts for each family. Finally, we compare the poverty
and affordability indicators with and without the beneﬁts. By
doing so we are able to estimate the maximum potential effect
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that the policy has in terms of ﬁghting fuel poverty, given the
actual features of the households, the distribution of income and
energy expenditure.
4.2.1. The energy beneﬁts are too small with respect to households
needs
The value of the beneﬁts depends on household size and, in the
case of gas, on the climatic conditions of the area of residence. In
2011, the beneﬁts for electricity ranged from €56 for a single or
two-person household to €124 per year for a family with at least
ﬁve members (see Appendix B). The gas beneﬁt varied between
€70 for a household in the warmest areas of the country with at
most four members to €264 for larger households in the coldest
regions. According to our estimates, the average amount of the
discount, included the related tax advantage, was €75.4 for
electricity and €135.2 for gas. Their impact on household budgets
is very limited: for the low income households, who are the
potential beneﬁciaries of the policy, the electricity and gas beneﬁts
are on average respectively equivalent to 0.9% and to 1.6% of their
net income. The resources required to combat residual income
poverty, for example, are much larger: in Table 5 we estimate the
average deviation from the minimum standard for the residual
income poor to be about €2400 in 2011. To include cross-national
comparisons, we note that the Winter Fuel Payment scheme in the
UK paid d400 to pensioners over 80 in 2011 and that this subsidy
could be added to advantages coming from the Warm Home
discount scheme and from other measures used in UK fuel poverty
policy (Hills, 2012).
4.2.2. The beneﬁts system does not signiﬁcantly impact on energy
affordability
Table 8 summarises what would happen if all entitled house-
holds took advantage of the scheme. In the ﬁrst column we present
the fraction of households not eligible for the beneﬁts who are in
income or fuel poverty according to the different criteria adopted. In
this exercise we take advantage of the fact that the eligibility rules
are constant across sectors. Therefore, if gas users qualify for the gas
bonus, we consider the sum of the two beneﬁts, and we report
a unique set of affordability indicators for gas and electricity.
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Table 7
Fraction of eligible households among poor households, households at risk of poverty and households with affordability problems.
Poor At risk
of poverty
Fraction of eligible households for electricity beneﬁts
With affordability problems
Budget share approach Residual income approach
Electricity Gas Electricity and gas
Normative Positive 5% Normative Positive 10% Residual
income poor
Under-users
Total 0.8740 0.4320 0.2292 0.4997 0.5894 0.2862 0.7553 0.5389 0.8720 0.1111
Household types
No children
Single 0.7744 0.3076 0.1879 0.4753 0.4642 0.2080 0.7563 0.3247 0.7600 0.0970
2 Adults, less than 65 yrs 0.9025 0.4906 0.1851 0.4739 0.6934 0.2775 0.8068 0.7610 0.9179 0.0755
2 Adults, at least 65 yrs 0.8024 0.3169 0.1701 0.3323 0.3998 0.1827 0.6820 0.2029 0.8784 0.0742
Others 0.7866 0.4035 0.1539 0.2851 0.4413 0.2466 0.6830 0.4755 0.8148 0.0497
With children
Single parent 0.8901 0.7453 0.4726 0.7160 0.7718 0.5575 0.8294 0.8896 0.8874 0.3295
2 Adults, 1 child 0.9581 0.5670 0.2945 0.5324 0.6696 0.3663 0.7863 0.9108 0.9507 0.1423
2 Adults, 2 children 0.9435 0.5423 0.2846 0.6097 0.7583 0.4482 0.7118 0.8283 0.9411 0.1146
2 Adults, 3 or more children 0.9644 0.6340 0.4135 0.6269 0.8637 0.4996 0.7523 0.8492 0.9664 0.3942
Others 0.9046 0.4730 0.2573 0.4674 0.6563 0.5471 0.7711 0.7795 0.8964 0.1464
Region
North 0.7737 0.3400 0.1404 0.4314 0.4827 0.2212 0.7168 0.3756 0.7866 0.0738
Centre 0.8522 0.3562 0.1863 0.4551 0.5436 0.4020 0.6924 0.4900 0.8113 0.1018
South and Islands 0.9370 0.5038 0.3314 0.5349 0.6393 0.3014 0.7886 0.8675 0.9342 0.3404
Total 0.8747 0.4254 0.2224 0.4992 0.5810 0.2862 0.7553 0.5389 0.8702 0.1018
Household types
No children
Single 0.7675 0.3004 0.1838 0.4798 0.4608 0.2080 0.7563 0.3247 0.7461 0.0786
2 Adults, less than 65 yrs 0.8944 0.4731 0.1821 0.4805 0.6612 0.2775 0.8068 0.7610 0.9126 0.0625
2 Adults, at least 65 yrs 0.8411 0.2995 0.1565 0.3127 0.3762 0.1827 0.6820 0.2029 0.9131 0.0674
Others 0.7885 0.3802 0.1384 0.3046 0.4206 0.2466 0.6830 0.4755 0.8259 0.0460
With children
Single parent 0.8777 0.7176 0.4570 0.7115 0.7465 0.5575 0.8294 0.8896 0.8709 0.3068
2 Adults, 1 child 0.9510 0.5647 0.2927 0.5306 0.6593 0.3663 0.7863 0.9108 0.9422 0.1398
2 Adults, 2 children 0.9377 0.5436 0.2785 0.5978 0.7665 0.4482 0.7118 0.8283 0.9342 0.1106
2 Adults, 3 or more children 0.9554 0.5853 0.3750 0.6068 0.8013 0.4996 0.7523 0.8492 0.9561 0.3759
Others 0.9079 0.4740 0.2571 0.4524 0.6633 0.5471 0.7711 0.7795 0.8980 0.1550
Region
North 0.7912 0.3466 0.1377 0.4312 0.4729 0.2212 0.7168 0.3756 0.8059 0.0730
Centre 0.8365 0.3645 0.1862 0.4582 0.5445 0.4020 0.6924 0.4900 0.7904 0.0969
South and Islands 0.9426 0.4949 0.3393 0.5426 0.6424 0.3014 0.7886 0.8675 0.9366 0.3267
Poor: households whose adult equivalent income is below the absolute poverty line. At risk of poverty: households whose adult equivalent income is lower than 60% of
median adult equivalent income. Statistics for gas affordability and eligibility of gas beneﬁts refer to gas users only. Gas and electricity bonuses have the same eligibility
criteria, thus the fraction of gas users eligible for the electricity discount coincides with the fraction of gas users eligible for the gas discount.
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The second column similarly shows the same values for the eligible
households where they did not take up the beneﬁts.
All our statistics conﬁrm that these families are more vulnerable
than households that are not eligible. After the payment of beneﬁts,
the situation improves only marginally with respect to income
poverty (the third and fourth columns). Among the recipients,
absolute poverty decreases by 0.9 percentage points, from 40.7% to
39.8%; this means that only 2.2% (¼0.9/40.7%) of the recipients who
are absolutely poor would exit from poverty status thanks to the
electricity and gas beneﬁts scheme. A similar value for the exit rate is
estimated from the “at risk of poverty” status, and the same rate is
even lower if we focus on the residual income poor. The small effect
that beneﬁts have on recipient welfare together with the fact that the
eligibility criteria leave many poor households without support (see
Table 7), implies that the overall potential effect of the policy on the
poverty indicators is negligible (see last column of Table 8).
Even though the targeting of the scheme does not take into
account actual expenditure for electricity and gas, the counter-
intuitive result is that the main effect of the beneﬁts scheme is to
improve the affordability indicators based on the budget share
approach; the bonus works “as if” it were targeting actual high
energy expenditures. In fact, comparing the affordability indices for
the eligible households before the payment of the bonuses (column
2 of Table 8) with the differences in the headcount ratios (column 4)
we see that the percentage of the recipients that may solve their
difﬁculties by taking advantage of the fuel discounts ranges
between 16.6% (¼0.0366/0.2204%) if we consider the combined
threshold of 5% for electricity and 10% for gas, and 18.3% (¼0.1186/
0.6449%) for the normative approach. The reduction of the head-
count indices for the entire population is much smaller due to the
limited coverage provided by the eligibility criteria: considering the
combined threshold of 5% for electricity and 10% for gas, the
payment of the beneﬁts reduces the headcount index to 3.7%
(column 4) from 4.2% (not reported in the table).
5. Conclusions and policy implications
Alternative indices of energy consumption affordability may
represent the Italian situation in very different ways, both in terms
of the number of the households in need and in terms of dynamics
over time. Despite this variability, the different measures agree in
indicating that energy consumption in Italy has become less
affordable since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007. Further-
more, all approaches are consistent in indicating that households
with children, those claiming difﬁculties to pay their bills, families
living in poorly maintained accommodations, tenants and resi-
dents in the Southern regions are particularly vulnerable.
Each measure focuses on different aspects of the affordability
problem, but any sensible indicator should combine information on
households income and the achievement of a minimum standard of
quality of life and it should consider under-spending as a potential
cause of deprivation. The actual implementation of these principles
has to deal with the nature of the available data and it needs to be
complemented by an analysis of the determinants of the afford-
ability problem.
The Italian scheme of energy beneﬁts, unlike schemes for
general income support as adopted in the UK’s fuel poverty strategy
(Hills, 2012) and unlike direct subsidies for investments to increase
home efﬁciency as widely-used in Sweden (Mahapatra et al., 2011),
consists of a lump-sum contribution for vulnerable consumers,
similar to schemes already adopted in France (Dubois, 2012).
The policy provides a limited beneﬁt to a potentially large number
of beneﬁciaries: in 2011 we estimate that about 11.5% of the Italian
households were eligible for the electricity beneﬁts and 9.2% for the
gas beneﬁt. The coverage of the beneﬁts varied signiﬁcantly across
types of households and regions. In 2011 the average beneﬁts received
were €68 for electricity and €92 for gas, which – unfortunately –
represent too small an amount to consistently ﬁght the issue.
The eligibility of a household is determined by a combination of
income, wealth, labour force participation and demographic com-
position, while it is independent of the actual spending on energy,
housing conditions and the cost of living experienced by the family.
This undermines the ability of the beneﬁts scheme to effectively
target households in need. At the same time, some of the funds are
paid to families that can hardly be considered vulnerable. Our
simulation shows that even in the most favourable scenario, the
implementation of the policy leaves the poverty and affordability
indices basically unaltered. The amount of information required to
the applicants and the procedure to certiﬁcate the household
taxable income may discourage many potential claimants and
further reduce the effectiveness of the intervention.
Our analysis suggests that the effectiveness of the Italian energy
beneﬁts scheme could be improved by heavily revising the elig-
ibility criteria. In particular, it is necessary to acknowledge that the
cost of living differs widely across the country: the material
conditions of households with similar income or wealth levels but
living in different areas of the country can be remarkably different.
Price heterogeneity is duly taken into account by the poverty and
affordability indices, but not by the administrative rule applied to
grant access to the beneﬁts. In our opinion, household spending
ability should instead be compared to area-speciﬁc thresholds
whose level should depend on the local cost of living.
The discounts are enjoyed by all low income households who
are electricity and/or natural gas consumers. The decision to use a
discount instead of a cash transfer excludes from the pool of eligible
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Table 8
Fraction of poor households, households at risk of poverty and households with affordability problems by eligibility status.
Not eligible Eligible Before after difference
Before payment After payment Eligible Total
Income poverty
Poor 0.0076 0.4067 0.3979 0.0088 0.0010
At risk of poverty 0.1249 0.7341 0.7208 0.0133 0.0015
Budget share approach for electricity and gas
Normative 0.2001 0.6449 0.5264 0.1186 0.0136
Positive 0.0177 0.4268 0.3502 0.0765 0.0088
5%þ10% 0.0185 0.2204 0.1838 0.0366 0.0042
Residual income approach for electricity and gas
Residual income poor 0.0080 0.4239 0.4203 0.0035 0.0004
Poor: households whose adult equivalent income is below the absolute poverty line. At risk of poverty: households whose adult equivalent income is lower than 60% of
median adult equivalent income. Statistics for gas affordability and eligibility of gas beneﬁts refer to gas users only. Gas and electricity bonuses shares the same eligibility
criteria, thus the fraction of gas users eligible for the electricity discount coincides with the fraction of gas users eligible for the gas discount.
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households those families who have been disconnected because of
arrears as well as vulnerable consumers who live in areas with no
access to the natural gas grid. This result is somewhat paradoxical if
the goal of the scheme is to ﬁnance the consumption of energy as a
“merit good”. In this respect, means-tested cash transfers can be a
more effective way to support households in need, ensuring a wider
coverage rate of the target population, without necessarily increas-
ing current (substantial) administrative costs.
Uncited referenceQ2
Waddams Price (2005).
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Appendix A. Setting the minimum standard for energy and
other goods/services
In order to implement the residual income approach to afford-
ability measurement, it is necessary to set the minimum reference
quantities (qup) for gas and electricity and (qcp) for the other goods
and services consumed. To maintain consistency with the deﬁnition
of absolute income poverty, these quantities should coincide with
those determining the absolute poverty line. We thus refer to the
components of the Italian absolute poverty line as documented by
the ISTAT (2009). The procedure allows us to identify the minimum
spending level for electricity, heating and cooking necessary to
achieve an acceptable standard of living. The deﬁnition of the
ofﬁcial poverty line does not make any distinction between house-
holds using different fuels for heating and cooking. For the purposes
of this paper, we consider the minimum expenditure for gas to
coincide with the heating and cooking component of the poverty
line, which can be seen as an average of the minimum of such costs
regardless of the form of energy. For electricity, ISTAT considers
basic needs to include spending on lighting, a television, a washing
machine and a fridge; the basic heating costs also include spending
for the use of gas for cooking and hot water. Having determined the
set of electric appliances, electricity consumption has been esti-
mated by the Authority for Electricity and Gas for different house-
hold sizes and priced at the rates in effect in January and October
2005. As for heating expenditure, its value has been inferred using a
linear regression model estimated on households living in houses
with an independent heating system (therefore excluding house-
holds with central heating systems), accounting for the size of the
(standard) dwelling, the region of residence and the age of the
household members. We use the parameters published by ISTAT in
the Survey on Family Budgets (SFB) to compute the minimum
household expenditure for electricity and heating at 2005 prices.
The current price values are obtained for electricity expenditure
using the national price index; for heating we refer to the national
aggregate price index which includes electricity, gas and other fuels
because ISTAT’s regression model does not distinguish between
different forms of energy.
In a similar way, we reconstruct the minimum expenditure for
the other consumption items (goods and services) that make up the
total bundle of the absolute poverty line. Wherever possible we use
regional price indices to update 2005 values to current prices.
Unfortunately, the SFB public use data ﬁle does not contain
detailed information on the date of birth of the household mem-
bers, nor the size of the urban area of residence. Therefore, it is not
possible to perfectly replicate the ofﬁcial poverty line for each
household. Nevertheless, a comparison between the statistics we
produce and the ofﬁcial poverty indices shows that the deviations
are marginal. A further deviation from ofﬁcial estimates occurs
when updating the values to the current price levels because we
can only use published price indices, while ofﬁcial statistics refer to
(unpublished) locally disaggregated price indices.
Appendix B. Electricity and gas beneﬁts amounts
See appendix Table B1.
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.09.008.
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